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Misrepresentations or omissions employed in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security are made unlawful by section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5, 2 promulgated under the Act. Neither of
these provisions, however, explicitly indicates the degree of intent
necessary to establish a violation. Rule 10b-5 itself contains language
that can be read as prohibiting completely innocent misrepresen-
tations,3 as well as language that seems to require some level of culpa-
bility.' As could be expected, this ambiguity has divided both com-
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** Associate Professor of Accounting, Indiana University.
1. The statute, in part, reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
2. The rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly by the use of
any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
3. See id. at § 240.10b-5(b)-(c).
4. See id. at § 240.10b-5(a).
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mentators5 and courts.' As could also be expected, the ultimate reso-
lution of this issue has been a matter of great concern to professionals
regularly involved in securities transactions, such as broker-dealers,
investment advisors, attorneys, and accountants. These professionals
feared a nonrestrictive and recovery-oriented interpretation that
would expose them to potential liability greatly disproportionate to
the fees charged for securities transaction services.
In late 1975 and early 1976 securities professionals turned their
attention to the case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.7 Ernst & Ernst,
the auditor of a Chicago brokerage firm, was sued under Rule 10b-5
for negligently failing to discover that the president of the brokerage
firm had perpetrated a massive fraud on the brokerage firm's custom-
ers.8 The district court, while rejecting the auditor's contention that
the plaintiff-customers could not bring a 10b-5 action grounded solely
in negligence, granted the auditor's motion for summary judgment on
finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst
5. See, e.g., Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167 (1974);
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Epstein, The Scienter
Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rlv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule l0b-
5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence
and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970); Miller & Subak, Lessons for Future
Counselling of Insurers Involving Ethics, Liabilities, and Securities Regulation, 30
Bus. LAW. 387 (1975); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972); Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get
Here?, 30 Bus. LAw. 95, 101-02 (1975); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals
Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973);
Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1969); Comment, Scienter and
Rule lOb-5: Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 493 (1974); Com-
ment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEo. L.J. 1108 (1969);
Comment, The Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule
lOb-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 99 (1975).
6. See text accompanying notes 25-40 infra.
7. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
8. The plaintiff charged Ernst & Ernst with negligently aiding and abetting
violations of Rule 10b-5 by Leston B. Nay, the former president and owner of 92% of
the stock of Ernst & Ernst's client, First Securities Company of Chicago. Nay bad
induced the plaintiffs to invest in bogus "escrow" accounts that Nay had never, in fact,
maintained. Nay had instead converted the plaintiff's funds to his own use immedi-
ately upon. receipt. Nay directed the plaintiffs to make their investments by checks
payable to himself or his bank account and established a "mail rule" forbidding other
First Securities employees to open any mail addressed to him or for his attention,
regardless of the duration of any absence by Nay from the business. No mention of
these fraudulent accounts appeared anywhere in First Securities' books or accounts,
and the scheme was not uncovered until Nay committed suicide in 1968 and left a note
describing First Securities as bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." The
plaintiffs argued that a proper audit by Ernst & Ernst would have led to the discovery




had conducted its audits in accordance with generally accepted au-
diting standards The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded,' holding that Ernst & Ernst had a statutory duty of in-
quiry into its client's practices, and that one who breaches such a
duty could be held liable for participating in a Rule 10b-5 violation
if the fraud would have been discovered but for the defendant's
breach of duty." The circuit court remanded the case, concluding
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Ernst &
Ernst had breached a duty of inquiry and disclosure by failing to
discover the fraud. 2
Many securities professionals hoped that the Supreme Court
would take the opportunity presented by a review of Hochfelder to
do two things. First, the Court could have explicitly held that an
accountant complying with generally accepted auditing standards
could not be found liable under Rule 10b-5. Second, the Court could
have rejected the theory that mere negligence was sufficient basis for
10b-5 liability, and could have required proof of actual intent to
defraud as a sine qua non for such liability.
On March 30, 1976, when the Supreme Court finally decided
Hochfelder, it was immediately apparent that the Court had not
addressed itself to the issue of whether compliance with generally
accepted auditing standards relieved a securities professional of
10b-5 liability. What the Court did hold on the question of the requi-
site level of intent necessary for 10b-5 liability has, moreover, become
a matter of dispute. 3 While contemporaneous commentators believed
9. Id. at 191 (district court opinion not reported).
10. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 1119.
12. Id. at 1111-12.
13. See, e.g., Adams, Lessening the Legal Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW.
1037 (1977); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its
Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HAST. L.J. 569 (1977);
Floor, The Scienter Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel
After Hochfelder, 12 NEW ENG. L. REv. 191 (1976); Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: An Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 29 (1976); Haimoff,
Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147 (1976); Hampson,
Accountants' Liability-The Significance of Hochfelder, J. ACcOUNTANCY, December
1976, at 69; Schnepper, The Accountant's Liability Under Rule 10b-5 and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Hole in Hochfelder, 22 AcCOUNTING
REV. 653 (1977); Note, Securities Law-Intent to Deceive, Manipulate, or Defraud
Must be Alleged in a Private Action forDamages Under Section 10(b) of The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 26 CATH.
U.E. REV. 180 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Allegations in Private Action]; Note,
Securities Law--Private Cause of Action For Damages Under Rule 10b-5 Requires
Scienter-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25 EMoRY L.J. 465 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Action for Damages]; Note, Securities Regulations-Rule 10b-5-Civil Liability
Will Not Be Imposed In A Private Cause of Action Under § 10(b) of the Act and Rule
1978]
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that securities professionals had been granted diminished responsi-
bility in securities transactions by Hochfelder," later authors have
suggested that Hochfelder's express rejection of a negligence stan-
dard, and the Court's requirement of "some element of scienter"'5 for
10b-5 liability, might represent no major change in the liability of
accountants.'6 It is with this latter group that we cast our lot.
This Article explores the meaning of the Hochfelder Court's use
of the term "scienter," by examining the historical context in which
the case was decided, the specific language of the opinion, and the
treatment Hochfelder has received in the lower federal courts that
have sought to apply it to subsequent controversies. This Article also
examines the relationship between scienter, as defined by such an
analysis, and conformance by auditors with generally accepted ac-
counting principles and auditing standards. Finally, an attempt is
made to formulate some guidelines for auditors to significantly re-
duce the risk of legal liability in securities practice. While the princi-
pal concern of this Article is with the impact of recent legal develop-
ments upon accountants, most of the observations advanced are gen-
erally applicable to other securities professionals as well.
II. "SCIENTER" AND HOCHFELDER'S HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
When one considers the semantic fog that has traditionally sur-
rounded the concept of scienter, the confusion generated by
Hochfelder's discussion of the term should come as no surprise. As
one observer noted, scienter "has been variously defined to mean
everything from knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea,
through the various gradations of recklessness, down to such nonac-
l0b-5 Absent An Allegation of "Scienter"; Proof of Negligent Conduct Will Not Suf-
fice-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 GA. L. Rv. 856 (1976); Note, Securities Regula-
tion-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder-Rule 10b-5: Reckless or Knowing Violations?, 2
J. CORPORATION L. 389 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reckless or Knowing Violations];
Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light
of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1977); Note, Evolving Standards of Personal
Liability and Scienter Under Rule 10b-5, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 344 (1977); 25 DEPAUL L.
REv. 962 (1976); Liggio, The "Ernst" Ruling-Expansion of a Trend, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
14, 1976, at 1, col. 2-4, Apr. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 2-4.
14. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 13; Hampson, supra note 13; Liggio, supra note
13.
Not all observers were pleased to find that the Supreme Court bad significantly
limited the potential liability of securities professionals. See, e.g., Allegations in Pri-
vate Action, supra note 13, at 192; Note, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5-Scienter
Required for Private Action, 42 Mo. L. REv. 337, 345 (1977).
15. 425 U.S. at 201.




tion as is virtually equivalent to negligence or even liability without
fault . . . ." One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that
"the most important step toward clarifying the law of scienter would
be to ban the word."' 8
In attempting to discern the meaning of scienter as used in Rule
10b-5, it is instructive to look first at the possible levels of culpability
that can accompany any misstatement or omission. These have been
defined by one authority as:
1. intentional misconduct designed to deceive the investor;
2. knowing misconduct whereby the defendant knows of the mis-
statement or omission, but lacks the actual intent to deceive;
3. reckless conduct whereby the defendant neither intended the
harm, nor actually knew of the misstatement or omission but has
acted carelessly;
4. negligent conduct whereby the misstatements or omissions
could have been avoided by the exercise of due care; and
5. innocent conduct whereby the misstatements or omissions could
not have been avoided even by the exercise of due care.'
17. 3 L. Loss, SEcURmEs REGULATION 1432 (2d ed. 1961).
18. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECRuiEs LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4(503), at 204.103 (Supp. 1971).
19. Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessary For Viola-
tion of the Federal Securities Laws In Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 571, 575 (1975).
For a similar explication of scienter in a securities context, see Bucldo, supra note
5, at 567-68, where the author posits the situation of two corporate officers who make
misleading statements in a press release about a new fiberglass substitute that the
corporation has acquired exclusive right to use. The author then observes that:
The defendants' degrees of knowledge and state of mind at the time the
shares were sold to the public could be any of the following:
1. They could have been convinced that the material was strong and
durable, based solely on their attorney's statements regarding testing by a
market research firm, and on successful first-year production. [This state
the author equates with innocent conduct. See id. at 568.]
2. They could have believed in the superiority of the material for their
uses, but may have known that these beliefs were based solely on the original
patentee's statements and their own initial success in experimental produc-
tion. [This state the author equates with negligence. See id. at 569.]
3. They might not have known whether the representations were true,
since they had not begun production or testing designed to discover whether
the material would be suitable or not. [This state the author equates with
recklessness. See id.]
4. They could have known of the falsity of their statements but hoped
that, with additional experimentation, the material would be suitable for
their purposes. [This state the author equates with knowing behavior. See
id. at 568.]
5. They could have known of the falsity of their statements and simply
intended to create a demand for the stock which would raise its market value
quickly, having no intention ever to market any of the products described
in the release. [This state the author equates with intent to defraud equiva-
lent to malice. See id.]
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Much of the confusion that has traditionally existed about the
meaning of scienter, and that continues to exist in Rule 10b-5 cases,2"
concerns the question of whether one must prove "intentional mis-
conduct" in order to establish scienter. When the meaning of scienter
is examined in the context of common law fraud, however, it becomes
apparent that proof of "knowing" or "reckless" conduct has always
been sufficient to demonstrate scienter.
In Ultramares v. Touche,2' for example-a case familiar to most
accountants as standing for the proposition that an accountant's lia-
bility for negligent misrepresentations in a financial statement would
not extend to third parties-Judge Cardozo indicated that an accoun-
tant could be held liable to third parties for recklessness, which he
defined as "the pretense of knowledge where knowledge there is
none."
22
This definition was elaborated on in State Street Trust Co. v.
Ernst:n
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accoun-
tants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an
opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that
there is no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which
to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate
the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to
an inference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by
those who rely on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness
and reckless disregard of consequences may take the place of delib-
erate intention.
24
A brief look at those pre-Hochfelder cases that rejected the no-
tion that mere negligence can provide a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability
also demonstrates that the majority of the circuits were moving to-
ward a definition of scienter that embraced both reckless and know-
ing misconduct. For example, the Second Circuit, in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co.," held that "willful or reckless disregard" of the truth was
sufficient for liability. This standard was later restated by a district
court as "actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth."" The
20. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir.
1969) (common law fraud elements need not be present), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(proof of a specific intent to deceive is not required), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
Stevens v. Vowel, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) (common law fraud need not be
alleged or proved).
21. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
22. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
23. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
24. Id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419.
25. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. Id. at 1306.
27. Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Third Circuit imposed liability for "fraudulent and material misre-
presentation," and the Fifth Circuit required "more than ordinary
negligence, 29 or "some culpability beyond mere negligence." 3 The
Tenth Circuit covered the waterfront, so to speak, when, in discussing
the trial court's instructions in Clegg v. Conk,3 it observed that the
instructions would have been in error had they indicated that liability
could be predicated upon untrue statements or omissions resulting
from "mere negligence" and without any manner of "scienter, con-
scious fault, intention, or recklessness." 3 The court reiterated that
"simple negligence would not be enough"'3 for liability, and noted
with satisfaction that the trial court's instructions sufficiently recog:
nized "the requirement of 'scienter' or conscious fault."34
On the other hand, the terminology employed by those few courts
that purported to eschew a scienter requirement strongly suggests
that those courts were laboring under the mistaken belief that proof
of scienter required proof of actual intent to defraud. For example,
the Eighth Circuit, in Myzel v. Fields,5 stated that "[p]roof of
'scienter,' i.e., knowledge of the falseness of the impression produced
by the statements or omissions made is not required ... -"3 for l0b-
5 liability. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit, in Kohler v. Kohler Co., 3
observed that "knowledge of the falsity or [the] misleading charac-
ter of a statement and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent
are not required to prove a violation of the statute .... "31
It is also interesting to note that in both of these cases the state-
ments were dicta, there being adequate factual bases for a finding of
actual intent to defraud. The Court in Hochfelder recognized this fact
by stating that "few of the decisions announcing that some form of
negligence suffices for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actually have involved only negligent conduct." 39 The courts may,
therefore, actually have applied the same standard despite semantic
differences in the tests that were espoused prior to HochfelderA'
28. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972).
29. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir. 1975).
30. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
31. 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
32. 507 F.2d at 1362.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1363.
35. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
36. Id. at 734-35.
37. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
38. Id. at 637.
39. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (citing Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974)); Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
40. See Haimoff, supra note 13.
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III. ERNST & ERNST V. HOCHFELDER
Much of the confusion surrounding the Hochfelder Court's use
of the term "scienter" would be eliminated if Hochfelder were viewed
as standing only for the proposition that 10b-5 liability cannot be
predicated upon negligence alone. The imposition of liability based
upon more culpable "reckless" or "knowing" behavior is therefore
consistent with the Court's language and reasoning." Rather than
pursue an exhaustive analysis of Hochfelder, a task that has been
performed elsewhere,42 this examination is confined to those aspects
of the Court's opinion that bear on this restrictive view.
An analysis of the Court's reasoning concerning the meaning of
the language of section 10(b)43 reveals a primary emphasis upon the
insufficiency of negligence as a basis for liability." The Court ob-
served that "the use [in section 10(b)] of the words 'manipulative,'
'device,' and 'contrivance,' . . . connotes intentional or willful con-
duct designed to deceive or defraud investors."45 Justice Powell
framed the issue before the Court as "whether a private cause of
action for damages [existed] under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the
absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud." ' 4  As previously noted, 47 however, "reckless" or
"knowing" behavior has traditionally sufficed for proof of scienter in
the area of common law fraud. The Court acknowledged this fact:
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
41. The authors are not alone in this view of Hochfelder. See, e.g., Floor, supra
note 13, at 192 ("We conclude that constructive knowledge of the crucial facts based
upon reckless disregard of those facts will supply the sufficient element of scienter for
Rule 10b-5 private liability."); Haimoff, supra note 13, at 162; Reckless or Knowing
Violations, supra note 13, at 403. But see Liggio, supra note 13, Apr. 14, 1976, at 2,
col. 3; Allegations in Private Action, supra note 13, at 188 ("The narrow Ernst & Ernst
test does not include the knowing use of a fraudulent device or constructive intent, i.e.
reckless behavior, two elements that had previously been included in standards articu-
lated by the circuits.").
42. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
43. The Court found the statutory language to be "dispositive of the appropriate
standard of liability" for 10b-5 actions. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
44. Indeed, since the plaintiffs in Hochfelder expressly disavowed any claim that
Ernst & Ernst had been more than negligent, the case can technically be distinguished
on that basis, relegating any other language in the opinion to the status of dictum. See
Floor, supra note 13, at 201-02. One commentator has argued that Hochfelder's holding
on the issue of the nonsufficiency of negligence may even be viewed as dictum, since
Ernst & Ernst may not even have been guilty of negligence. See Action for Damages,
supra note 13, at 470 n.19.
45. 425 U.S. at 199.
46. Id. at 193. In the footnote accompanying Justice Powell's statement of the
issue, scienter was described in the same terms. See id. at 193 n.12.
47. See notes 25-40 supra and accompanying text.
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We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstan-
ces, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.4s
The Court's intent to limit the scope of its holding to a rejection
of the negligence standard is repeatedly demonstrated elsewhere in
the opinion. For example, the Court described scienter as requiring
"knowing or intentional misconduct,"4 and, in describing the schism
between the circuits, contrasted those cases holding that "negligence
alone is sufficient for civil liability" with those requiring "some type
of scienter-i.e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth,
or knowing use of some practice to defraud. . .. -50 At another point,
the Court characterized its holding as "our conclusion that § 10(b)
was addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and
cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone," 5' and
observed that the language of section 10(b) clearly demonstrates
"congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different
from negligence." 5
The Court's comments on the legislative history of the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act demonstrate a similar emphasis upon rejection
of the negligence standard. The Court first cited a statement by a
representative of the drafters of section 10(b) describing the section
as a "catchall" provision aimed at "manipulative" and "cunning"
devices. 3 The Court then observed that "[ilt is difficult to believe
that any lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use these
words if the intent was to create liability for merely negligent acts or
omissions." 51 The Court also noted language in a congressional report
commenting on the express civil liability sections of the 1934 Act
which stated that a defendant "may escape liability by showing that
the statement was made in good faith,"5 and therefore concluded
that "[t]he catchall provision of § 10(b) should be interpreted no
more broadly."56 Suits obviated by this interpretation are those predi-
48. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. In this note the Court also acknowledged that some
courts of appeal had held recklessness to be sufficient for scienter (citing Clegg v.
Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), and Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)).
49. 425 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 193 n.12.
51. Id. at 201.
52. Id. at 199.
53. Id. at 202-03 (citing statements found in Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Ses. 115 (1934).
54. 425 U.S. at 202-03.
55. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(193411
56. 425 U.S. at 206.
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cated upon negligence, which can coexist with "good faith." Actions
not barred by this interpretation are those in which lack of "good
'faith" is shown by proof of "knowing" or "reckless" conduct.,
The Court noted further that the express liability sections of the
1933 Act, which grant civil relief for negligence, 6 are governed by
procedural restrictions that significantly limit the availability of such
relief, thereby deterring spurious claims lodged solely for their poten-
tial settlement value." Since these restrictions are not applicable to
judicially created 10b-5 suits, the Court concluded that their absence
from section 10(b) indicated a congressional intent to preclude pri-
vate 10b-5 actions grounded in negligence, 0 the approval of which
would "nullify" the effect of the restrictions.6' Reasoning predicated
on the avoidance of spurious claims does not, however, bar 10b-5
actions grounded on "knowing" or "reckless" conduct, since proof of
such behavior imposes a greater burden on plaintiffs than does proof
of negligence. This additional burden discourages spurious claims
and thus satisfies the underlying policy of the procedural restrictions
of the 1933 Act.62
Furthermore, when one views the Court's phraseology against
the backdrop of prior 10b-5 cases, it becomes even more evident that
the Court intended to do nothing more than reject the negligence
standard. The Court must have expected that those circuits that had
previously embraced a recklessness standard would seize upon the
opportunity presented by the Court's express reservation regarding
recklessness and continue to impose liability for recklessness. It also
must have seemed apparent to the Court that those tribunals that
had previously recognized a negligence standard would be inclined to
embrace the recklessness standard as the next best alternative. More-
over, since no prior 10b-5 case had clearly required an actual intent
to deceive as a prerequisite for liability," it is unlikely that the Court
would have chosen such equivocal language had it intended to reject
the bulk of previous 10b-5 caselaw.14
Although the Court expressly refrained from considering general
questions of public policy underlying the securities acts, 5 an exami-
nation of such considerations supports the appropriateness of a con-
57. See Reckless or Knowing Violations, supra note 13, at 400.
58. These are sections 11, 12(2), and 15 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h, § 771(2),
and § 77o, respectively).
59. See 425 U.S. at 210 n.30.
60. See id. at 210-11.
61. See id. at 208-10.
62. See Reckless or Knowing Violations, supra note 13, at 401.
63. See notes 25-40 supra and accompanying text.
64. See Floor, supra note 13, at 206.
65. See 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
[Vol. 63:79
AUDITOR LIABILITY
ception of scienter embracing both "knowing" and "reckless" con-
duct. The Court has frequently identified an underlying congres-
sional concern for the protection of investors against false and decep-
tive practices in the purchase or sale of securities, and has stressed
the importance of a flexible, nonrestrictive interpretation of the se-
curities acts to effectuate that purpose.6 Clearly, a "knowing" or
"reckless" scienter standard would be consistent with this prophylac-
tic purpose."
The Court has also frequently recognized that an underlying
objective of the securities acts is to facilitate full disclosure to the
investing public." It has been argued that a negligence standard
would deter voluntary corporate disclosures, since such a standard
threatens great liability for an inadvertent mistake, thus frustrating
the policy of disclosure."9 A "reckless" or "knowing" standard, on the
other hand, would seem to be an acceptable balance between the
need for investor protection and the need for voluntary disclosure of
information.70
The Court's fear that adoption of a negligence standard would
"significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose
liability upon accountants and other experts who perform services or
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts"' may also
be abated by a "reckless" or "knowing" standard. The Hochfelder
Court reiterated its previous expression of concern in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,72 that "the inexorable broadening of
the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law will ulti-
66. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(Acts to be interpreted "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
[their] remedial purposes") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971) ("Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restric-
tively.").
67. In keeping with the broad remedial aims of the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws such a standard of responsibility, while requir-
ing proof of more than mere negligence, would not permit [defendants] to
escape liability by pleading ignorance where it can be shown that red flags
putting them on notice or providing warning signals of either undisclosed or
misrepresented facts of a material nature were readily apparent to all and
that a routine check would have disclosed the misrepresentation.
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 398 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See also Reckless or Knowing Violations,
supra note 13, at 402.
68. See SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
69. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
70. See Reckless or Knowing Violations, supra note 13, at 403.
71. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
72. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), cited at 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33.
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mately result in more harm than good,"73 and noted once again Judge
Cardozo's famous comment in Ultramares7l that "[t]he hazards of
a business conducted on these terms [(the threat of auditor liability
to third parties for negligence)] are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes
[auditors] to these consequences. ' 75 A "knowing" or "reckless" test
does not extend liability as far as a negligence test does and is consis-
tent with the common law fraud concepts that Cardozo found to be
an adequate basis for liability.
76
Finally, two actions by the Court since it decided Hochfelder
serve to buttress the limited significance attributed to the case. First,
the Court denied certiorari to an appeal from the criminal conviction
of an accountant for violation of section 32(a) of the 1934 Act 77 less
than three weeks after the Hochfelder opinion was rendered. In
United States v. Natelli, 7 an accountant made false statements in a
proxy. In affirming the accountant's conviction, the court of appeals
approved the district court's jury instruction that the jfirors might
find the accountant "knew" of the falsity of the statement if he acted
"'in reckless disregard' of the facts or if he 'deliberately closed his
eyes'" to the obvious.7 Although Natelli was not a 10b-5 case, it is
doubtful that recklessness could suffice for criminal violation of the
1934 Securities Act and yet be insufficient as a basis for 10b-5 civil
liability."0 Second, the Supreme Court has recently described
Hochfelder as "holding that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 does
not lie for mere negligence ...."I
IV. HOCHFELDER'S PROGENY
The following analysis of post-Hochfelder scienter cases provides
considerable support for the proposition that recklessness will ulti-
mately gain recognition as a sufficient basis for 10b-5 liability. Some
of the circuits have already accepted the recklessness standard. Cases
in other circuits, although suggesting that 10b-5 actions require either
73. 421 U.S. at 747-48.
74. See note 21 supra.
75. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 172 N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (quoted
in 421 U.S. 723, 748).
76. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970) (amended 1975 & 1977).
78. 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
79. 527 F.2d at 324. Natelli, after the accounting period in question, had ac-
cepted a writing from the management of his client, National Student Marketing,
which purported to represent a substantial contract in replacement of a similar con-
tract which had been previously rejected.
80. See, e.g., Note, Herzfeld Revisited After Hochfelder: The "Scienter" Stan-
dard Applied to the Reporting of Uncertainties, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 252, 258 (1976).
81. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
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knowing or intentional misconduct, often contain language recogniz-
ing common law fraud concepts. These cases, which generally suggest
the courts' misunderstanding of applicable precedent, invariably in-
volve either a total absence of reckless conduct on the part of the
defendant, or clear evidence of knowing or intentional conduct. Since
in no case has a provably reckless defendant escaped liability, the
language of circuits that have not yet clearly accepted the reckless-
ness standard may be considered dicta.
A. THE SECOND Cmcurr
As previously noted, prior to Hochfelder "willful or reckless dis-
regard for the truth" was firmly established in the Second Circuit as
the requisite level of scienter for 10b-5 liability.2 An examination of
the Second Circuit's post-Hochfelder decisions confirms the contin-
ued viability of recklessness as a basis for liability in that circuit.
The major case involving auditor liability under 10b-5 in the
Second Circuit is Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &,
Horwath.8 The defendant Laventhol was sued for misleading state-
ments contained in the audited financial statements of Firestone
Group, Ltd. (FGL), a California real estate company. The contro-
versy centered around Laventhol's accounting treatment of two No-
vember, 1969, real estate transactions in which FGL purportedly pur-
chased and resold 23 nursing homes at a profit.Y These transactions,
supposedly entered into in the final days of the accounting period,
greatly altered FGL's otherwise discouraging financial posture.,
From the outset, however, there were enough suspicious circumstan-
ces surrounding the transactions to alert even the most obtuse ob-
server. Both "agreements" were on identical forms and were ob-
viously incomplete. 6 They called for small down payments with the
great bulk of the respective purchase prices to be paid after the ac-
counting period. 7 Laventhol learned that the purchaser's net worth
was miniscule."5 Neither transaction was recorded in FGL's books and
there were no corporate minutes or resolutions referring to the trans-
82. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
83. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The plaintiff had purchased over $500,000 worth
of FGL stock. In addition to Laventhol, plaintiff had also sued Allen & Co., FGL's
underwriter, and FGL's principals, all of whom entered into settlements with plaintiff.
See id. at 29.
84. See id. at 30.
85. The purchase and sale of the nursing homes would have been the largest
single transaction in the history of FGL. See id.
86. Each statement referred to nonexistent "exhibits" which were to disclose the
actual properties subject to sale. See id.
87. FGL was to pay $5,000 down on the nursing homes and receive $25,000 down
on the resale. See id.
88. The purchaser's net worth was only $100,000. See id. at 31.
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actions,89 a situation to which Laventhol responded by preparing
adjusting entries for FGL's books."0 As the court later observed,
"[l]ittle wonder that when at the outset a Laventhol partner was
discussing the situation from an accounting standpoint, he referred
to it as a 'fictitious or proposed or artificial transaction.'"91
Based on this record, Laventhol, on December 6, 1969, sent FGL
a consolidated balance sheet and income statement that reflected a
figure of $1,795,500 as "unrealized gross profit" resulting from the
transactions. An explanatory note to the income statement stated
that "because of the circumstances and nature of the transactions,
$1,795,500 of the gross profit thereon will be considered realized when
the January 30, 1970 payment is received.""2 This, however, was not
enough to satisfy FGL, which threatened to withdraw its account and
sue Laventhol if it was unsuccessful in securing the desired private
placement. Laventhol responded by marking the first report as
"Withdrawn and Superseded" and providing a second report."
In the second report, which was distributed to FGL's investors,9
the designation in the income statement had been changed from
"unrealized gross profit" to "deferred gross profit" and the explana-
tory note changed to read: "Of the total gross profit of $2,030,500,
$235,000 is included in the Consolidated Income Statement and the
balance of $1,795,000 will be considered realized when the January
30, 1970 payment is received. The latter amount is included in de-
ferred income in the consolidated balance sheet."" Laventhol did
qualify its opinion letter in the second report by declaring: "In our
opinion, subject to the collectibility of the balance receivable on the
contract of sale . .. the accompanying consolidated balance sheet
and related consolidated statements of income and retained earnings
present fairly the financial position of [FGL]."1 The plaintiff read
the Consolidated Statement of Income and Retained Earnings, but
did not read Laventhol's opinion letter or explanatory note. 7 Neither
of the two real estate transactions was ever consummated, and within
a year FGL had filed a bankruptcy petition.9
89. See id. at 30.
90. See id. The letter from Laventhol's audit manager to FGL's controller con-
taining these entries referred to them as "the journal entries which we generated for
the financial statements at November 30." Id. (emphasis by the court).
91. Id.









The trial court entered a judgment against Laventhol in the
amount of $153,000, finding the defendant's report to be "materially
misleading"9 in numerous respects and that Laventhol had the nec-
essary scienter, namely, "knowledge of the fact that the figures cre-
ated a false picture."'' 0
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals cited
numerous accounting principles that it believed Laventhol had vio-
lated by treating the transactions in question as though they were
consummated and as though current and deferred profit had been
realized.'0 ' The "deferred profit" phraseology, the court observed,
"conveyed the erroneous impression that all that profit was so much
cash in hand and would be'recognized periodically in futuro just as
if it were prepaid interest or management fees.' 0 The court observed
that this misleading impression could "have been remedied by sim-
ply not recognizing the sales as completed transactions for the ac-
counting period ending November 30, 1969."1 3 Laventhol argued that
its qualified opinion should insulate it from liability, but the court
found the qualification to be inadequate, since ". . . Laventhol did
not provide a clear explanation of the reasons for the qualification."I"
What test for scienter did Herzfeld adopt? Although Herzfeld
has been cited as standing for the proposition that recklessness is
sufficient for 10b-5 scienter, 0 ' it is difficult to justify such a conclu-
sion. In distinguishing the case before it from the facts of Hochfelder,
the Herzfeld court observed: "The accountants here are not being
cast in damages for negligent nonfeasance or misfeasance, but be-
cause of their active participation in the preparation and issuance of
false and materially misleading accounting reports upon which Herz-
feld relied to his damage."'' 9 While there can be no doubt that Laven-
thol was "reckless," it also seems certain that there was sufficient
evidence of "knowing" conduct present to limit the scope of the
99. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
100. Id. at 127 (quoting Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d
540, 541 (2d Cir. 1973)).
101. See 540 F.2d at 34-37.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. at 37.
104. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). The court stated that "a simple note would
have sufficed saying in substance: 'Agreement for the purchase of [the nursing homes]
. .. and the sale thereof . . . , have been executed. When, as and if these trans-
actions are consummated, FGL expects to realize a profit of $2,030,500.'" Id. It is
interesting to speculate whether such a disclaimer would truly have sufficed to nullify
the otherwise misrepresentative character of the financial statements, in view of the
other factors known to Laventhol that indicated the transactions were of questionable
validity. Clearly the trial court would not have thought so.
105. Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977); Aldrich
v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
106. 540 F.2d at 37.
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court's holding to the proposition that "knowing" conduct will suffice
for 10b-5 liability. 7
Subsequent Second Circuit cases have, however, clearly en-
dorsed the "willful or reckless disregard for the truth" standard enun-
ciated in the circuit's pre-Hochfelder decision of Lanza v. Drexel,'0
which extended liability to those who actively participate in or give
knowing assistance to a fraudulent scheme.'' The subsequent Second
Circuit cases have also retained Lanza's qualification that defendants
charged with a passive failure to disclose material facts have no gen-
eral duty to make such disclosures, absent some notice that mislead-
ing information is being conveyed. '
This distinction between active and passive failure to disclose
was clearly enunciated in Hirsch v. duPont.'" The plaintiffs in Hirsch
were the major partners in a brokerage firm that had merged with F.
I. duPont, losing all their capital in duPont's subsequent failure.
They filed a 10b-5 suit against the New York Stock Exchange, which
had supervised the merger, and Haskins & Sells, duPont's auditor.
The suit was brought for failure to disclose that duPont had been in
violation of the Exchange's net capital rule, and had made up the
deficiency by liquidating "long" securities count differences."2 The
107. Arguably Laventhol would not have been guilty of "intentional miscon-
duct" unless it had been shown that it actually knew the agreements in question were
bogus. See note 19 supra.
108. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
109. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233, 1238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rolf v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Van Alan v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Poloron Prods., Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 72
F.R.D. 556, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lewis v. Black, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,638, at 90,165 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
110. We conclude that a director in his capacity as a director (a non-
participant in the transaction) owes no duty to insure that all material,
adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the
corporation on whose board he sits. A director's liability to prospective pur-
chasers under Rule 10b-5 can thus only be secondary, such as that of an aider
and abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpetrated
by others.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Murphy v. McDon-
nell & Co., 553 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1977); Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Halcyon Sec. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 439 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Faturik v. Woodmere Sec., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111. 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
112. "Long" differences occur when the "physical inventory of securities on
hand, fails to tally with the broker's records of ownership," id. at 754 n.5, and the
broker has securities on hand whose owner cannot be determined from the broker's
records. Those securities whose owners could not be identified were assumed to be
duPont's and sold. See id. at 754 n.5.
[Vol. 63:79
AUDITOR LIABILITY
court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, holding that neither defendant
owed a duty of disclosure to the plaintiffs and that the information
was, in any case, available to the plaintiffs upon the exercise of due
diligence."' In discussing the issue of aider-abettor liability of the
Exchange, the circuit court observed: "We do not believe that the
scienter required for rule 10b-5 aider-abettor liability. . . is present
where, as here, the defendant entertains a reasonable belief that 'all
the facts' have been fully disclosed.""' The court went on to say that
"knowledge of the fraud, and not merely the undisclosed material
facts, is indispensable [for aider-abettor liability]." 5 With respect
to Haskins & Sells's liability, the court observed: "We are not con-
vinced, on the basis of the record before us, that Haskins & Sells's
treatment of duPont's certified statement of financial condition
violated generally accepted accounting practices as they stood in
1969." The court noted that it was not until 1973 that the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants required disclosure of such
violations of net capital rules,"' and that the information had been
available to the plaintiffs, who had failed to request it." 8
In Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.," 9 the court of appeals
endorsed a recklessness standard for defendants who owe injured par-
ties a fiduciary duty of disclosure.'" In Rolf, a registered representa-
tive of a broker-dealer was charged with aiding and abetting the
allegedly fraudulent management of an investor's portfolio by an
investment adviser whom the broker-dealer supervised. In the course
of nine months, the plaintiff's entire portfolio of $1,423,000 worth of
stocks had been liquidated and replaced by many highly speculative
issues, producing a fifty percent decline in the value of the investor's
holding.2 ' In affirming the district court's finding against the repre-
sentative, the court of appeals noted that it had recognized the con-
cept of aiding and abetting liability for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
violations,' and concluded:
113. See id. at 753.
114. Id. at 759 (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 761.
117. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBic AccouNTANs, AuDrrs OF BRO-
KERS AND DEALERS'IN SECURITIES 104 (1973).
118. See 553 F.2d at 761.
119. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
120. Id. at 46. See Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1978] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,576, at 94,431-32 (construing Rolfl; Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo
Securities Clearance Corp., [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,573, at 94,399
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
121. These later securities were referred to by the representative as "junk," Rolf
v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, 570
F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1978), with most investments in low value, over the counter
securities. 570 F.2d at 42 n.4. The value of the portfolio declined to $712,000. Id. at
42.
122. The Court in Hochfelder expressly did not rule on whether aiding and abet-
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[W]here as here, the alleged aider and abettor owes a fiduciary
duty to the defrauded party, recklessness satisfies the scienter re-
quirement . . . . [B]y leaving open the possibility that reckless-
ness might satisfy the scienter requirement, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that in certain instances a recklessness standard might be
appropriate ....
• ..[O]n a linguistic level, the term scienter is used by the
Supreme Court to mean, in the disjunctive, "knowing or intentional
misconduct." . . . The word "knowing" implies conduct that is
somewhat less focused than "intentional" activity, which commonly
is characterized by a specific mental state . . . .The common law
tort of fraud has adopted a recklessness standard as one means of
satisfying the requisite intent element of that cause of action. Simi-
larly, securities law cases have recognized that recklessness may
serve as a surrogate concept for willful fraud.ln
It seems clear that an auditor who prepared a materially mis-
leading financial statement would be treated as a primary or "active"
participant in the alleged fraud, and subjected to the recklessness
standard. In Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,' 4 for exam-
ple, the district court dismissed a shareholder's derivative 10b-5 suit
against the auditor of the defunct Walter Reade Organization, Inc.,'2
because the complaint failed to allege fraud with the particularity
required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'12 The
court did, however, grant the plaintiff leave to file an amended com-
plaint, and noted that the "plaintiff may need to plead facts showing
that PMM acted with either knowledge that the Reade financials
ting liability was appropriate under 10b-5. 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7. The Hochfelder
Court did, however, cite to authorities discussing the appropriateness of such liability:
Brennan v. Midwestern United States Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966),
motion to dismiss denied, 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); and Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Se-
curities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemni-
fication, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597, 620-45 (1972). While most auditors
will be charged as aiders and abettors, the authors are of the opinion that the Court's
reservation of a holding on the issue, coming as it did in the face of the known propens-
ity of the courts of appeal to recognize such liability, constitutes a de facto recognition
of the aiding-abetting theory. Likewise, it is our opinion that the "knowing" assis-
tance-required'by cases such as Brennan-can be satisfied by facts that demonstrate
that an auditor certified figures for which he had no substantial basis for belief and
was, therefore, "reckless."
123. 570 F.2d at 44-46 (citations and footnote omitted).
124. 445 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. Plaintiffs argued that the 10-K reports prepared by Peat for Walter Reade
were false and misleading due to substantially overstated accounts receivable. Conse-
quently, the net worth and earnings picture was distorted. See id. at 521.
126. Fan. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that "all averments of fraud . . .[and] the
circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity. Malice, in.
tent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind. . . may be averred generally."
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were false and misleading, or in reckless disregard of the truth, if he
is to state the circumstances surrounding the fraud with particular-
ity."In
Similarly, in Lewis v. Black, 12 the plaintiff purchased shares of
C. I. Mortgage Group, a real estate investment trust, and sought
recovery against C. I.'s auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., for
aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5 by preparing and certi-
fying C. I.'s annual report and certain interim reports that allegedly
contained misleading statements and omissions. Peat again moved to
dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to plead fraud with the
particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules. The court
dismissed the complaint with the comment that the allegations of
fraud were stated in a confusing manner, and that "plaintiff must
allege additional circumstances or facts which will . . . support an
inference of knowing or culpably ignorant material misstatement or
omission by Peat Marwick.'' 129
B. THE THIRD CIRcUT
The post-Hochfelder position of the Third Circuit on the ques-
tion of 10b-5 scienter is relatively clear: recklessness will suffice. This
state of clarity was not initially apparent, however, as the first post-
Hochfelder case in the circuit, Straub v. Vaisman &' Co., 3 contained
language that could be read to imply that proof of actual intent to
defraud was required. The defendant in Straub was a New Jersey
broker-dealer, upon whose recommendation the plaintiff purchased
stock in Mark I Offset. The defendant was a financial consultant for
Mark I, and as such, had knowledge of Mark I's imminent bank-
127. 445 F.2d at 524.
It is interesting to note in this context that an allegation that the defendant
"should have known" of the misleading character of his representations will be held
insufficient as an allegation of scienter in the second circuit, as it is viewed as alleging
only negligence. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 432 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gross
v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rich v. Touche
Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
128. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,638 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
129. Id. at 90,168. See also Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), in which the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by three trustees of an REIT
because there was no evidence that any of the three participated in the preparation or
verification of a prospectus alleged to contain untrue statements and material omis-
sions. Id. at 1240. The court refused, however, to grant the motion as to a fourth trustee
who had coordinated the offering on behalf of the underwriter's representative which
participated in analyzing the trust and verifying the accuracy and completeness of the
statements in the prospectus. Id. at 1241.
130. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
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ruptcy.'3' To aggravate matters, the shares were sold to the plaintiff
at a price above the prevailing market, and were acquired from an-
other company in which the defendant had a controlling interest. The
defendant was also the marketmaker in Mark I. '32 In order to recover
in a 10b-5 action, the court of appeals declared, "[t]he plaintiff must
prove knowledge by the defendant, intent to defraud, failure to dis-
close or misrepresentation, materiality of the information and, in
some instances, reliance by the plaintiff." ' The court went on to note
that "[tihe district court found a specific intent to defraud which
satisfies the scienter requirement discussed in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder."'3
Two months after the decision in Straub, however, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware decided McLean v.
Alexander,1 31 in which an accountant was found guilty of both
"reckless" and "knowing" behavior. Plaintiff McLean was a private
investor who had purchased all the outstanding stock of Technidyne,
Inc., a small company that developed and marketed a laser-beam
pipelaying system called "Technitool." Technidyne was experiencing
serious cash flow problems due to the collapse of an exclusive dealer-
ship arrangement it had previously enjoyed, thus forcing it to at-
tempt direct-selling of Technitools and to secure outside capital. In
the course of the negotiations preceding the sale, McLean was given
a "confidential" report on Technidyne that misrepresented the rea-
son for the collapse of the exclusive dealership arrangement,'36 and
purported to show the sale of sixteen Technitools in less than three
months through the company's direct-sale program.'37 This picture of
the Technitool as a saleable item was supported by a certified audit
prepared by Cashman & Schiavi at Technidyne's behest'38 that listed
131. Mark I filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition within a month of the sale
to plaintiff. See id. at 594.
132. The defendant's conduct was so opprobrious that the trial court labeled it
"shocking to the conscience of this court." Id.
133. Id. at 596.
134. Id.
135. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
136. The real reason for the collapse of the exclusive dealership arrangement was
the poor quality of the Technitools, which repeatedly broke down on the job, resulting
in a refusal by the distributor to accept Technitools until the reliability problems were
cured. See id. at 1073. The confidential report indicated that the relationship with the
distributor was terminated by Technidyne due to the unreliable character of the dis-
tributor. See id. at 1063.
137. See id. at 1063-64.
138. Technidyne had been Schiavi's client since 1967, and Schiavi had subse-
quently entered into a partnership with Cashman. Technidyne retained the partner-
ship on December 10, 1969, to conduct an audit as of November 30, 1969, informing
Schiavi that the audit was needed to help Technidyne secure outside capital and that
time was of the essence due to Technidyne's negative cash flow. See id. at 1067.
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the sum of $73,733 in accounts receivable as a current asset and
denoted the amount as considered "Fully Collectible."' 39 This figure
was primarily attributed to sixteen direct sales to three customers.
In reality, however, these sixteen "sales" were, as the plaintiff discov-
ered when he took control of the company, either consignments or
guaranteed sales in which the supposed buyers were only obligated
to pay for the Technitools if they were able to resell them."'
In the resulting 10b-5 suit against Cashman & Schiavi, the court
found numerous culpable deficiencies in the firm's audit of Techni-
dyne. Schiavi had, for example, issued four confirmation re-
quests-three going to the alleged purchasers of the sixteen units, and
the fourth to Erie Marine, a purchaser of tubes and a power supply
unit. Erie was the only customer that returned a confirmation, and
it disputed over one-third of the amount allegedly owed, a fact that
was never mentioned in the audit.' Under pressure from Technidyne
to complete the audit quickly, Schiavi indicated that he could not
proceed further without some form of confirmatory response from the
other three customers. Technidyne then instructed its salesmen to
call their accounts and request that confirmatory telegrams be sent
to Schiavi. Schiavi subsequently received two telegrams which pur-
ported to be from the two major purchasers of Technitools, acknowl-
edging the existence of their orders, but not the existence of a debt
to Technidyne.4 2 Schiavi made no attempt to contact any of the
alleged buyers, electing instead to rely on the telegrams.4 3 Had he
made such contact, he would have discovered that the telegram pur-
porting to be from the largest account was a fake sent by a Techni-
dyne salesman. " The court described the situation as one in which
139. Id. at 1065.
140. See id. at 1067 & n.38.
141. See id. at 1069-70.
142. "Although these telegram messages did not, even remotely, confirm an
amount due and owing, but instead referred solely to the customers' respective pur-
chase orders, Schiavi relied fully upon them." Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original).
143. "Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that he knew absolutely nothing about
the alleged purchasers or their credit worthiness, Schiavi made no efforts to contact
the customers and verify the telegrams." Id. at 1070.
144. Had Schiavi contacted [the purchaser's agent] at any point in
the five-day period between receipt of the phone message from Western
Union and the issuance of the audit, he would have learned that the telegram
had been forged. However, in total and reckless disregard of the facts that
he had never had any prior contact with, or knowledge of [the purchaser],
that the telegram was a non sequitur in relation to the confirmations and
that he had no way of knowing who sent it, Schiavi never bothered to contact
[the purchaser's agent].
Id.
The court also found other factors in Technidyne's records of the transactions that
should have put Schiavi on notice that the sales were suspect. The invoices sent to the
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the auditors crumbled in the face of client pressure, ' and character-
ized Schiavi's conduct as more than negligence, but less than actual
intent to defraud-including both knowing behavior and reckless-
ness. '46 The court defined recklessness as "pretend[ing] to knowl-
edge he did not have."' 47
Schiavi, the court concluded, had thus possessed sufficient scien-
ter to warrant the imposition of 10b-5 liability. Citing Hochfelder as
holding "that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or inten-
tional misconduct,"'' the court observed: "If the result were other-
wise, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be more restrictive in sub-
stantive scope than the substantive law of fraud. Reckless disregard
for the truth is also a cognizable basis for liability in common-law
fraud actions."'49 The court further expressly recognized that reck-
lessness could provide a basis for 10b-5 liability, phrasing the issue
before it as "whether the accountant proceeded in a deliberate, know-
ing or reckless manner in the preparation of his audit.""' The court
later explained the basis for its position: "There is little reason to
distinguish between knowing misbehavior and reckless misbehavior
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In practice, one who recklessly
makes a statement inherently possesses some knowledge of its fals-
ity."',5
The most recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals pronouncement
on the scienter issue firmly established that recklessness alone is a
sufficient predicate for 10b-5 liability. In Coleco Industries, Inc. v.
three buyers were all issued on the cutoff date of the audit, and two of them contained
payment terms postponing the original payment dates, which had already passed at
the time Schiavi commenced work on the audit. Id. at 1071. In addition, the shipping
dates stated in the two major accounts had already passed and yet, at the time of the
audit, Technidyne still held all but one of the units to be shipped. Id. The total picture
created by these facts led the court to observe that "Schiavi had facts at hand from
which he knew that unless management supplied satisfactory explanations, there were
serious potential problems about the accounts receivable and Technidyne's sales fu-
ture." Id. at 1084.
145. "Pressed for an early release of his report, Schiavi accommodated his client
by abandoning all caution." Id. at 1083.
146. "Schiavi's conduct constitutes far more than mere negligence, but falls
short of a preconceived actual intent to defraud. His behavior embraces both actual
knowledge of material facts not revealed and reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at
1080 (footnotes omitted).
A Fourth Circuit district court has characterized this case as "indicat[ing] that
knowing conduct is to be equated with scienter." SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429
F. Supp. 1148, 1171 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1977). The Virginia court, however, "decline[d] to
follow th[e] decision." Id.
147. 420 F. Supp. at 1084.
148. Id. at 1080 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1074.
151. Id. at 1084.
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Berman, "1 2 the plaintiff had purchased a swimming pool manufactur-
ing company, and sought to recover for losses incurred due to misre-
presentations contained in the financial statements of the company
relating to the cost of manufacturing the pools. The trial court denied
recovery against the principals of the acquired company on the
ground that they made the statements in good faith, being misled by
the mistakes of their accountant.13 The trial court held that "to
establish the element of scienter in an action brought under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a party must prove injury resulting from a
conscious deception or from a misrepresentation so recklessly made
that the culpability attaching to such reckless conduct closely ap-
proaches that which attaches to conscious deception."'' 4 The court of
appeals concurred, declaring:
We agree with the trial judge, and the majority of the courts which
have passed on the question since Hochfelder, that plaintiff may
recover under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations that are recklessly
made as well as those made with conscious fraudulent intent. We
need not precisely define the nature of the recklessness which might
give rise to 10(b)(5) [sic] liability, however, for the finding by the
trial court that the actions of the . . . defendants were not reckless
is amply supported by the record under any of the standards which
other courts have suggested."'
C. THE FIFrH CmCUIT
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, after a period of initial un-
certainty among some of its district courts,"' has clearly sanctioned
recklessness as the appropriate standard for 10b-5 scienter, thereby
reaffirming its pre-Hochfelder position."17 In Dupuy v. Dupuy, "I ap-
parently intentional misrepresentations and omissions concerning
the financial prospects of a closely held corporation caused the plain-
tiff to sell his interest to his brother at a grossly inadequate price.
After a verdict for the plaintiff, the district court granted a judgment
152. 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977) (U.S. appeal pending).
153. 423 F. Supp. 275, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The accountant, Zelnick, was found
liable to the defendants for his error. Id. at 308-10 & n.59, and had entered into a
settlement with the plaintiffs for the sum of $350,000. 567 F.2d at 573.
154. 423 F. Supp. at 296.
155. 567 F.2d at 574 (footnote omitted).
156. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235, 235-40 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(acknowledgement of undefined scienter requirement); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp.
55, 57 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (same); Ford v. Cannon, 413 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (M.D. Fla.
1976) (mere negligence not sufficient).
157. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Vohs
v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
158. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1978).
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notwithstanding the verdict due to the plaintiff's failure to exercise
due diligence. With an interesting application of Hochfelder, the
court of appeals reversed. The court stated that "[a]lthough the
'scienter' requirement may still be unsettled, the Supreme Court has
imposed upon defendants a standard not stricter than reckless-
ness." '59 The plaintiffs negligence should not bar recovery, the court
concluded, since Hochfelder's relaxation of the standard of care for
defendants necessitated a similar reduction in the standard applica-
ble to plaintiffs. The court announced that the new test should be
whether the plaintiff "intentionally refused to investigate 'in disre-
gard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow.' "1'6
Shortly after its decision in Dupuy, the court of appeals, in First
Virginia Barikshares v. Benson,' further supported the view that
reckless behavior is sufficient proof of scienter by stating that "[t]he
defendant must know of the falsity of the information [he supplies],
or must act in reckless disregard of its falsity, or must intend to
deceive.","2
D. THE SixmTH Cmcurr
The post-Hochfelder position of the Sixth Circuit awaits defini-
tive resolution, as the most recent decision on the scienter issue,
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,"3 contains both recklessness
and intent language, and facts that justified a finding of actual intent
to deceive. The plaintiffs in Adams were former shareholders of Stan-
dard Knitting Mills who had exchanged their shares for preferred
shares in Chadbourn, Inc., in a merger between Standard and Chad-
bourn. The plaintiffs' claim arose from allegedly misleading state-
ments and omissions in a proxy statement prepared for Chadbourn
by the defendant accounting firm, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co."'
The plaintiffs claimed that the proxy statements were deficient for
three reasons: 1) failure to adequately disclose that a preexisting
bank loan agreement placed restrictions on the payment of dividends
and on the redemption of Chadbourn preferred stock; 2) failure to
disclose that Chadbourn had continuing serious deficiencies in its
159. Id. at 1020.
160. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th
ed. 1971)).
161. 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub noma. Walter E. Heller & Co.
v. First Virginia Bankshares; 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
162. Id. at 1314.
163. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683 (E.D. Tenn.
1976).
164. At the time of the trial, all other defendants had entered into a settlement
agreement with the plaintiffs.
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data processing systems that jeopardized its business future and cast
substantial doubt upon internally generated business statistics; and
3) failure to disclose that the Chadbourn audit had not been con-
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.,"5
The Standard proxy statement did note the existence of the loan
agreement restrictions, but incorrectly described the stock subject to
the restrictions as "common" rather than "capital." There was ample
evidence that Peat knew of the mistake prior to the mailing of the
statement, but failed to inform the plaintiffs of it.6' Peat did use the
correct term in a proxy statement that was subsequently sent to the
plaintiffs in connection with an unrelated transaction, but repeated
the error in Chadbourn's 1970 annual report, which was mailed to the
plaintiffs some four months later.167 Peat argued that its use of the
correct term in the second proxy statement vitiated the effect of its
earlier error and that, in any event, there was no accounting require-
ment compelling disclosure of the redemption restrictions.'" The
court firmly rejected both arguments,"' and further found that the
repetition of the error in the 1970 annual report constituted an at-
tempted "cover-up" by Peat.17
165. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fm. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683, at 90,351-55
(E.D. Tenn. 1976).
166. Peat had earlier sent a proxy statement to the shareholders of another
candidate for merger with Chadboum which used the correct term "capital" instead
of "common." Id. at 90,354. Additionally, Peat's audit manager, prior to mailing the
standard proxy statement, had received a telephone call from Chadbourn's attorney
informing him of the mistake. Id. at 90,355.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 90,357.
169. In response to the argument concerning the second proxy statement, the
court stated:
Peat made no effort to highlight or call this modification to the attention of
the plaintiffs. . . . [I]t is unreasonable to assume plaintiffs would examine
closely the financial statements and footnotes of Chadbourn contained in
that proxy statement considering it had been only two months since plain-
tiffs had fully read Chadbourn's reported financial condition in the Standard
proxy.
Id.
As to the argument that accounting principles did not require disclosure, the court
responded:
[A] review of the numerous accounting authorities and principles cited in
this case indicate [sic] an intent to provide for full disclosure in financial
statements.. . . Beyond doubt Peat knew plaintiffs would be relying on its
financial statements and that the information regarding the ... preferred
stock would be of particular interest to plaintiffs in making a decision
whether or not to approve the merger. In these unique circumstances defen-
dant's failure to fully and fairly disclose is clearly a serious breach of profes-
sional responsibility.
Id.
170. The court observed that "the second error in the long term debt footnote
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With respect to the alleged deficiencies in Chadbourn's data
processing system, the court found that they "were of such a perva-
sive nature and importance that their existence did, or at a mini-
mum, could have significantly affected the entire operation of Chad-
bourn and would therefore most directly relate to matters contained
in the financial statements."'71 The court found that Peat knew of the
deficiencies,' and that its failure to take them into account and
disclose them violated generally accepted accounting principles.'7"
The court's phraseology on the scienter issue is unfortunately,
but perhaps intentionally, imprecise. First, the court cited SEC v.
Coffey,'74 a pre-Hochfelder Sixth Circuit case equating scienter with
"wilful or reckless disregard for the truth,"'75 but then hedged by
observing that, since Coffey involved a Securities Exchange Commis-
sion suit for injunctive relief, the standard enunciated may be a mini-
mal one, applicable only to such cases. "'76 Then the court, without
discussing Hochfelder's reservation regarding recklessness, cited
Hochfelder as holding that scienter is shown by proof of "intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud," but concluded that "[not]with-
standing this stringent element of proof, . . . in all the facts and
circumstances of this case, scienter on behalf of the defendant has
been established.'77 Finally, the court touched all the bases once
again by stating that Peat acted "willfully, with intent to 'deceive'
and 'manipulate' and in 'reckless disregard for the truth.' """7 It
is impossible to tell whether this confusion of language was a result
of the traditional judicial reluctance to decide issues not directly
before the court, or whether it indicates that the court was itself
uncertain as to whether recklessness, standing alone, would be a suf-
ficient basis for liability.
The other major Sixth Circuit case on point is Peltz v. Northern
Ohio Bank,' one of a series of 10b-5 suits growing out of the demise
was wilful and designed to conceal the truth of defendant's previous inexcusable error
from plaintiffs. The court has not found and Peat has not suggested any other reasona-
ble explanation for defendant's conduct ... ."Id. at 90,357-58 (emphasis in original).
171. Id. at 90,365.
172. One of Peat's employees had observed that "controls is [sic] out of con-
trol," and Peat had sent Chadbourn a letter identifying the deficiences. Id. at 90,359.
173. "[D]efendant failed to follow and apply general accounting principles
which was essential for fair presentation of Chadbourn's financial position and the
results of its operations, by not disclosing or compelling Chadbourn management to
disclose its gross [electronic data processing] deficiencies." Id.
174. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
175. Id. at 1314.
176. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 95,683, at 90,366
(E.D. Tenn. 1976).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 90,367.
179. 430 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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of the defendant bank.8 0 Peltz had purchased stock in the bank,
relying on allegedly false and misleading financial statements pre-
pared for the bank by defendant Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Com-
pany. Peat moved to dismiss, arguing that the allegation in the com-
plaint that Peat "knew or should have known" that the statements
"misrepresented or falsely presented the true aspect of [the bank's]
financial condition" did not sufficiently allege scienter in the manner
required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Hochfelder.'8 ' The court noted Hochfelder's reservation regarding
recklessness and the Sixth Circuit's pre-Hochfelder holding that
recklessness would suffice' 2 and said:
Relying on SEC v. Coffey, this court concludes that scienter, an
essential element in plaintiff's claim against PMM, requires proof
of either actual knowledge of misrepresentations or "wilful or reck-
less disregard for the truth." The word "knew" meets the first half
of this requirement, but "should have known" may not be equated
in this court's view with "reckless disregard for the truth." There-
fore, those words will be stricken."3
When one considers the strong support for the recklessness stan-
dard in the extant district court cases in the Sixth Circuit, the cir-
cuit's pre-Hochfelder espousal of the recklessness standard, and the
general trend in the other circuits toward recklessness, ultimate rec-
ognition by the court of appeals seems likely.
E. THE SEVIENTH CIRcurr
One might reasonably expect that the Seventh Circuit, whose
acceptance of negligence as sufficient for 10b-5 liability made it the
birthplace of Hochfelder, would avail itself of the opportunity pre-
sented by the Hochfelder Court's reservation regarding recklessness,
and adopt recklessness as the least restrictive available alternative.
An examination of recent cases in the Seventh Circuit confirms this
hypothesis. The Seventh Circuit has displayed little of the hesitancy
evident elsewhere, and has consistently limited Hochfelder's applica-
tion to the proposition that negligence is an insufficient predicate for
10b-5 liability. In the process, it has given one of the fullest explica-
tions of the recklessness concept.
In Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,'" the circuit's first post-Hoch-
felder scienter case, the plaintiff, who was an officer, director, and
180. See Braun v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ohio 1977);
Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
181. 430 F. Supp. at 383-84.
182. See text accompanying notes 174-76 supra.
183. 430 F. Supp. at 384 (footnotes omitted).
184. 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
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minority shareholder in Black Company, sought recovery from Mei-
ster Brau and Continental Illinois National Bank for their actions
in an undisclosed transaction whereby the assets of Black were trans-
ferred to Meister Brau in exchange for unregistered Meister Brau
stock. When the plaintiff discovered that the Meister Brau stock was
worth far less than Black's assets,"" he instituted suit against Conti-
nental, which had voted for the transfer in its capacity as executor
of the estate of the deceased founder and controlling shareholder of
Black.
The court of appeals, concurring with the judgment of the dis-
trict court that the bank's failure to disclose the unfair nature of the
transfer was a violation of Rule 10b-5, observed that there was a
conflict of interest between the bank's desire to sell the estate's shares
to Meister Brau and its fiduciary duty to Black Company and plain-
tiff Bailey. '
The scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5, the [district] court
held, had been satisfied by evidence that the bank was "grossly
negligent in failing to recognize the unfairness of the asset transfer"
and, "blinded by a conflict of interest, [the bank] wantonly
ignore[d] evidence of the unfairness of [the] securities transaction
to the corporation and therefore fail[ed] to disclose this evidence
to those shareholders whose interests lie with the corporation."'",
The next significant' s statement of the Seventh Circuit's posi-
tion on scienter occurred in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp.'5" Sundstrand had contemplated a merger with Standard Kols-
man Industries, Inc. (SKI), and in furtherance of that purpose ac-
quired from John D. Huarisa, then president and chairman of the
board of SKI, an option to purchase the shares of SKI held by the
family of the deceased founder of SKI. The proposed merger was in
large part due to the efforts of Henry W. Meers, a Chicago underwri-
ter and merger broker, who was also an outside director of SKI. Meers
was to act as SKI's merger broker for the transaction in return for a
$150,000 fee. Sundstrand subsequently decided to cancel the merger
185. "The transaction was manifestly unfair to the Black Company and its mi-
nority shareholder Bailey . Id. at 992.
186. Id. at 993.
187. Id. (quoting the district court opinion, 378 F. Supp. 869, 876 (N.D. Ill.
1973)).
188. In the interim between Bailey and Sundstrand, a district court, in Neill v.
David A. Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1976), denied a motion to dismiss a
customer suit against a broker-dealer for fraudulent violation of margin requirements
in the sale of the customer's securities. The defendant argued that Hochfelder barred
the plaintiff's claim. The court characterized Hochfelder as requiring an allegation of
scienter and concluded that "since the Plaintiffs did allege some form of scienter
beyond mere negligence, they have avoided the impact of Ernst & Ernst." Id. at 82.
189. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
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negotiations and SKI ultimately merged into Sun Chemical. Sund-
strand subsequently filed suit against Huarisa, Sun, and Meers for
alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 in connection with its purchase of
Huarisa's option. Sundstrand's claim against Huarisa and Sun was
based upon alleged misrepresentations by Huarisa and other SKI
officers,'" and upon their failure to disclose the existence of reports
on SKI compiled by a dissident SKI director and his accounting firm
which were critical of certain SKI accounting practices."' Sund-
strand's claim against Meers was primarily predicated upon his fail-
ure to disclose the existence of the adverse reports.
The trial court held Huarisa and Sun liable, finding that the
misrepresentations and omissions had been made "deliberately or
recklessly."'' The court of appeals approved the application of this
test, noting Hochfelder's reservation regarding recklessness,"13 and
the court's previous holding in Bailey v. Meister Brau,94 which it
characterized as "akin to the alternative reckless [sic] standard"''
announced by the trial court.
The court of appeals also approved the trial court's holding
against Meers, and determined that since his liability was based
upon reckless nondisclosure rather than reckless misrepresentation,
a full discussion of the recklessness standard was warranted.'" The
court noted that recklessness was sufficient for fraud at common law,
and stated: "Since there is no hint in Hochfelder that the Court
intended a radical departure from accepted Rule 10b-5 principles, it
would be highly inappropriate to construe the Rule 10b-5 remedy to
be more restrictive in substantive scope than its common law ana-
logs."'9 The court then held that 10b-5 liability could attach for
reckless omissions,"' and adopted the definition of reckless omissions
adduced in Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development
Authority:"'
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
190. The substance of the misrepresentations concerned SKI's 1968 and 1969
earnings, the interest of other companies in acquiring SKI at a price greater than that
contemplated by the Sundstrand offer, and the amount of potential write-offs of de-
ferred preproduction costs for 1968. Id. at 1039.
191. These reports questioned "the propriety of SKI's continued deferral of pre-
production costs and the failure to recognize losses on some . . . contracts which
ultimately resulted in a net loss of 15¢ per share in SKI's report for 1968." Id.
192. Id. (trial court opinion not reported).
193. Id. at 1039-40 (citing 425 U.S. at 194 n.12).
194. See text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.
195. 553 F.2d at 1040.
196. Id. at 1044.
197. Id. (footnote omitted).
198. Id.
199. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it.
2"
Under this test, the court indicated, "the danger of misleading buyers
must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable man would
be legally bound as knowing, and the omission must derive from
something more egregious than even 'white heart/empty head' good
faith. 2 0' In regard to the latter phrase the court observed that if the
trial judge found that the defendant truly forgot to disclose the infor-
mation, or that it never occurred to him to disclose it, no liability
would attach, even though the reasonable man would never have
forgotten.' This observation is questionable, since there is little in
the Franke test that clearly leads to this conclusion. In any event,
from a practical standpoint this good faith defense may be of little
consequence, since it is unlikely that, for example, an auditor who
made no attempt to verify accounts receivable before certifying them
would be able to successfully convince a court or jury that he merely
"forgot" to do so, and thereby avoid liability to an innocent purchaser
who had been injured by relying on the figures certified.
The most recent expression of the Seventh Circuit on the scienter
issue may be found in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 23 a class action
in which the purchasers of short-term notes of a defunct consumer
finance company sued the underwriter of the issue. Prior to the deci-
sion in Hochfelder, the court of appeals had affirmed a finding
against the defendant based upon negligence, holding that, although
the defendant had honestly relied upon the audited financial state-
ments of the defunct company, it had breached a duty to make rea-
sonable inquiries that would have led to the discovery of the issuer's
fraud.0 1 The Supreme Court vacated this earlier decision and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in the light of Hochfelder.2"
On remand, the court of appeals noted that it had previously
held that recklessness could constitute scienter,2 1 but then observed:
In view of the Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder of the
statutory scheme of implied private remedies and express remedies,
the definition of "reckless behavior" should not be a liberal one lest
any discernible distinction between "scienter" and "negligence" be
200. 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
201. 553 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted).
202. Id. at n.20.
203. 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
204. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1975).
205. John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 425 U.S. 929 (1976) (vacating and remand-
ing 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) in light of Hochfelder).
206. 554 F.2d at 792-93.
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obliterated for these purposes. We believe "reckless" in these cir-
cumstances comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely
a greater degree of ordinary negligence. We perceive it to be not just
a difference in degree, but also in kind.
17
The court again quoted the Franke test, 18 and found no factual basis
for a finding of recklessness on the part of the underwriter."9 Thus,
the Franke test for recklessness seems to be fairly well established in
the Seventh Circuit.
F. THE NmNTH CiRcurr
The Ninth Circuit had not, until very recently, adopted a clear
post-Hochfelder position on scienter. In the initial case on point in
the circuit, Robinson v. Heilman,"' the plaintiffs were the owners of
a small company that was sold to Nova-Tech, Inc., in exchange for
Nova-Tech shares. Nova-Tech subsequently went bankrupt and the
plaintiffs filed a 10b-5 suit against the president of Nova-Tech, alleg-
ing that statements in the merger agreements concerning the finan-
cial condition of Nova-Tech were false, and that the defendant either
knew or should have known the truth at the time the agreements were
executed. " '
The trial court decided the case prior to Hochfelder and, follow-
ing the lead of White v. Abrams,"' instructed the jury that a corpo-
rate officer had a duty to advise the purchasers of corporate stock "if
any material statement made to [them] is false or misleading, if
such director knows or in the exercise of ordinary care should know,
first, that such statement was made, and second, that it was false or
misleading." '13 The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict
against the defendant, and remanded the case for reconsideration in
the light of Hochfelder. The circuit court did not define scienter,
being content to correctly characterize Hochfelder as barring private
10b-5 suits based on negligence.2" '
The Ninth Circuit's pre-Hochfelder acceptance of negligence as
207. Id. at 793.
208. See text accompanying notes 200 supra & 226 infra.
209. See 554 F.2d at 793.'See also Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., [1978] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,587, at 94,510-11 (1st Cir. 1978) (discussing Seventh Circuit reck-
lessness test) (dictum); Cook v. Avien, 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978) (same) (dic-
tum).
210. 563 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977).
211. Nova-Tech had furnished the plaintiffs with an audited financial statement
as of March 31, 1968, and an unaudited statement as of July 31, 1968. The agreement
contained warranties to the effect that no adverse material change in the financial
condition of Nova-Tech had occurred since the July 31, 1968, statement. Id. at 1306.
212. 495 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974). The court in White adopted a five-factor test
of liability focusing on the goals of securities fraud legislation, which accepted negli-
gence as sufficient for 10b-5 liability. Id. at 734-35.
213. 563 F.2d at 1306.
214. "Hochfelder's rejection of a negligence standard ... under Section 10(b)
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a basis for 10b-5 liability,"' coupled with its perception of the holding
in Hochfelder, seemed to indicate a likelihood that recklessness
would ultimately gain recognition there. This prognosis has been con-
firmed by the circuit's recent holding in Nelson v. Serwold.21' Nelson
involved a suit by the heir of an estate which had sold 36 shares of a
small telephone company's stock for $5 per share. The stock was sold
to the president of the company, who was the record holder of 56%
of all outstanding shares. When the estate's attorney wrote the com-
pany inquiring about the status of the stock, he was informed that
no dividends had accrued and none were expected. The defendant's
reply failed to disclose that the book value of the stock was approxi-
mately $60 per share, and that a "control group" of shareholders
existed who intended to modernize the company and transform it into
a marketable enterprise. When the company was sold six years later,
the shareholders received approximately $500 per share.
The defendants argued that reversal of the district court's deci-
sion for the plaintiff was dictated by Hochfelder's scienter require-
ment. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that "Ernst & Ernst,
we think, only went so far as to eliminate negligence as a basis for
liability. We agree with those courts which have found that Congress
intended the ambit of § 10(b) to reach a broad category of behavior,
including knowing or reckless conduct." " '7 The court concluded "that
the defendants' omissions were [made], at the very least, with
knowledge,""2 ' and therefore the scienter requirement was satisfied.
G. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit has yet to adopt a clear position on the scien-
ter issue. The extant cases in the circuit contain language that could
be read to require at least "knowing" conduct, if not "intentional"
misconduct. Further developments must occur in the Tenth Circuit,
however, before any firm conclusions on the subject may be drawn.
In Holdsworth v. Strong,"3 9 the parties were three couples, the
Holdsworths, the Strongs, and the Tanners, who had originally
owned equal numbers of the outstanding shares of Sans-Copy, a
closely held corporation marketing a timekeeping system for law of-
fices. Defendant Strong was in charge of the business and had been
given a controlling interest. Annual dividends were disbursed by
Strong until 1970. In 1971, Strong informed the plaintiffs that the
and Rule 10b-5 is both sweeping and unqualified." Id. at 1307.
215. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's pronouncement in White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), see 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 18, at 420.1-.7 (Supp. 1975).
216. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978).
217. Id. at 1337.
218. Id.
219. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
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company had invaded capital to pay the 1970 dividends and would,
therefore, be unable to issue dividends for 1971. Strong subsequently
offered to purchase the plaintiffs' shares, stating that the corporation
would not be able to pay dividends in the future. The plaintiffs sold
their shares to Strong, but subsequently sought to rescind the trans-
action on the basis of violations of Rule 10b-5 and common law fraud,
arguing that the corporation was in fact a growing business, and that
Strong had committed numerous breaches of his fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs in his management of the corporation." The trial court
found that Strong had knowingly and intentionally made false repre-
sentations, and entered a judgment for the plaintiffs.
21
The court of appeals affirmed, noting that "substantial evidence
of intentional fraud and deceit is present. ' 22 The court cited
Hochfelder as "holding that proof of negligence is not enough in a
10b-5 action; that such an action will not lie in the absence of an
allegation and proof of scienter, the same being an 'intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud,' "223 and subsequently characterized
Hochfelder as holding that "only intentional conduct. . . could give
rise to a recovery under Rule 10b-5. '2 2 Later in the opinion, however,
the court observed that "[a]nother important result of the Ernst &
Ernst decision is that it brings the standards for 10b-5 liability closer
to the analogous tort of deceit or intentional misrepresentation."
The court did not indicate that it understood that recklessness is a
sufficient basis for deceit at common law and did not discuss
Hochfelder's reservation regarding recklessness. Indeed, recklessness
is not discussed in the opinion, and the clear evidence of actual intent
to defraud limits the court's holding to the indisputable proposition
that actual intent to defraud will suffice for scienter under
Hochfelder.
Shortly after the Holdsworth decision, the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma delivered a similarly confusing opinion
in Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority,26 a suit
by a purchaser of industrial revenue bonds against a law firm that
had served as bond counsel and had allegedly failed to disclose sev-
220. The plaintiffs charged that numerous operations expenses claimed by
Strong were excessive and improper, some being paid to Strong and his relatives; that
Strong had borrowed corporate funds which he had failed to repay; and that the $1500
purchase price was unfair in the light of the earnings and growth potential of the
corporation. Id. at 690.
221. Id. at 691.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 693.
224. Id.
225. Id,
226. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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eral facts relating to the economic soundness of the issue. The court
granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment, finding
that the defendants' limited role as bond counsel included no duty
to warrant the economic merits of the issue, and that there was no
evidence of any wrongdoing by the defendants. 27
In discussing the necessity of proof of scienter for 10b-5 liability,
the court stated that "[a] plaintiff in a Section 10(b) case must
plead and prove that the defendant was guilty of conscious fault,
which would require that the defendant have actual knowledge of the
matters complained of. ' 228 The court cited the pre-Hochfelder, Tenth
Circuit case of Clegg v. Conk29 as authority for this statement, but,
as previously seen, Clegg contains language that recognizes reckless-
ness as a sufficient basis for 10b-5 liability.?' The district court in
Franke then stated that Hochfelder had acknowledged Clegg as the
correct view, and concluded that there was no evidence in the record
to show that the defendants "had any knowledge which would permit
a finding of the necessary scienter at trial."2 3' The plaintiff had
argued that recklessness was a sufficient substitute for scienter,
prompting the court to formulate a definition of recklessness in the
context of omissions cases that was ultimately adopted by the Sev-
enth Circuit.22 The court in Franke did not, however, rule on the
issue, stating instead that "[i]f indeed there is any validity to the
proposition that obviousness of risk of harm can be a substitute for
guilty knowledge, it is sufficient to note that there is no evidence here




The most recent significant pronouncement of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's view of scienter was in Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns
& Co.,23 where the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the plaintiffs Rule 10b-5 claim for failure to allege scienter.
The court stated that "[w]illful or intentional misconduct, or the
equivalent thereof, is essential to recovery, ' 3 but failed to elaborate
on the nature of such "equivalent" conduct. The precise position of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on the scienter issue therefore
remains uncertain.
227. Id. at 722, 726.
228. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
229. 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
230. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
231. 428 F. Supp. at 725.
232. See text accompanying note 200 supra.
233. 428 F. Supp. at 725.
234. 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
235. Id. at 169. See also In re Clinton Oil Co. Securities Litigation, [1977-78




V. SCIENTER AND COMPLIANCE WITH GAAP & GAAS
The relationship between liability under the securities acts and
conformance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
and generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), has long been a
topic of concern among accountants. Accountants have traditionally
argued that conformance with professionally accepted standards
should exonerate them from liability. The courts, however, have been
hostile to what they view as "private" lawmaking; their assumption
being that a profession's natural tendency toward self-protection may
not always produce standards that adequately protect the public in-
terest.
Prior to Hochfelder, it was apparent that compliance with GAAP
and GAAS would not necessarily insulate an accountant from liabil-
ity. In United States v. Simon,"' the Supreme Court refused to hear
a case in which the defendant accountants had been held criminally
liable for violating the 1934 Securities Act and the mail fraud statute
by failing to disclose, in a client's financial statements, that the presi-
dent of the company had engaged in suspect transactions indicating
a misappropriation of company funds. The defendants presented tes-
timony by eight expert witnesses that GAAP did not require such
disclosure. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
charge to the jury, which made the ultimate liability of the defen-
dants dependent upon the answers to two interrelated questions. Did
the financial statements as a whole fairly present "the financial posi-
tion of the audited firm"? 7 If not, did the defendants act in "good
faith"?m Post-Hochfelder Rule 10b-5 cases will essentially ask the
same questions, merely rephrasing the latter question to ask whether
the misleading character of the financial statements is due to conduct
on the part of the auditors that is sufficiently culpable to satisfy the
scienter requirement.
Although it would not provide an automatic defense, it is proba-
bly fair to say that thorough adherence to, and compliance with,
GAAP and GAAS will not produce a materially misleading financial
statement in most instances. Liability will hinge, however, upon
whether the statement "fairly presents" the financial position of the
audited firm, and not upon whether there is compliance with GAAP
and GAAS. Consider, for example, the trial court's comment in
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath:
236. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
237. Id. at 805.
238. Id. One may infer from the opinion as a whole that the court viewed good
faith in this context as compliance with the duty to disclose that arises when an auditor
has reason to believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is not being managed in
the best interests of its shareholders.
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Much has been said by the parties about generally accepted ac-
counting principles and the proper way for an accountant to report
real estate transactions. We think this misses the point. Our inquiry
is properly focused not on whether Laventhol's report satisfies eso-
teric accounting norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, but
whether the report fairly presents the true financial position of Fire-
stone, as of November 30, 1969, to the untutored eye of an ordinary
investor.2 '
This emphasis upon "fair presentation" is well established, and is
supported both in the earliest4 0 and most recent cases . 24 Its message
for auditors is clear: when in doubt, provide full disclosure.
While compliance with GAAP and GAAS may not ensure the
attainment of "fair presentation," the failure to comply with GAAP
and GAAS may be evidence of scienter. As previously shown, an
accountant who knows, or should know, facts that cast doubt on the
validity of the figures in the financial statement, or knows that he
lacks a sufficient basis for belief in those figures, and nonetheless
certifies them, has the requisite scienter for 10b-5 liability. Hence,
the failure to apply basic auditing procedures designed to test the
sufficiency of the data provided by the client's management, or the
failure to "follow through" on suspicious discoveries made in the
course of the audit, can constitute the "reckless" or "knowing" be-
havior necessary for 10b-5 liability.
42
It is instructive to note that in each of the previously discussed
post-Hochfelder cases finding audit violations of 10b-5, the court also
found that the defendants failed to comply with GAAP and GAAS.
In Herzfeld,"3 the court held that Laventhol's treatment of the antici-
pated income from the unconsummated transactions as current and
deferred profit was contrary to "the elemental and universal account-
ing principle that revenue should not be recognized until the 'earning
process is complete or virtually complete, and 'an exchange has taken
place.' "244 The court likewise found that Laventhol's failure to take
239. 378 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 F.2d
27 (2d Cir. 1976).
240. See, e.g., In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058-59 (1942)
("[Tloo much attention to the question whether the financial statements formally
complied with principles, practices and conventions accepted at the time should not
be permitted to blind us to the basic question whether the financial statements per-
formed the function of enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence.").
241. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1085 (D. Del. 1976);
Sonde, supra note 5, at 4.
242. See Haimoff, supra note 13, at 162 ("Accountants who gullibly accept trans-
parently fishy explanations from their clients of an obviously suspicious transaction
are liable under 10b-5, no matter what their mental state.").
243. See text accompanying notes 83-105 supra.
244. 540 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting AMEucAN INsTrUTE OF CERTIED
PUBLIc AccouNTANrs, AccouNrTNG PiuwcipLs BoARD STATEMENT No. 4 § 150, and 2
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adequate steps to investigate the bona fides of the transactions vio-
lated Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33 (SAP 33), which
provides, in part, that "[s]ufficient competent evidential matter is
to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries and confir-
mation to affirm a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the fin-
ancial statements under examination.' 'Ns The court also found Lav-
enthol's attempt to qualify its opinion to be deficient under another
chapter of SAP 33 .241 Similarly, in McLean,247 the court observed that
Schiavi's failure to adequately verify Technidyne's accounts receiva-
ble by following up on unreturned confirmation letters and seeking
adequate management explanations of inconsistencies in company
records, was contrary to basic auditing standards. Likewise, in
Adams, 25 the court found that Peat had violated several accounting
standards.
2 1
Although it is possible to fully conform to GAAP and GAAS and
still be "reckless," the only situation in which this is likely to occur
is where the auditor has notice of facts that materially affect the
financial position of the audited firm but that are not specifically
covered by official pronouncements of GAAP. A good example of this
phenomenon can be found in Escott v. BarChris Construction
Corp.,2° which involved, inter alia, treatment of profits on sale and
leaseback transactions. The official accounting pronouncement in
this area-Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 52I1had not
yet been issued at the time the financial statements in question were
issued. The auditors chose to recognize the profits currently, a treat-
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (CCH)
9036 (1978)).
245. Id. at 35 (quoting STATEMENTS ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE No. 33, Ch. 2,
at 16 (1963)).
246. Id. at 35-36 (quoting STATEMENTS ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE No. 33, Ch. 10,
at 58 (1963)):
When a qualified opinion is intended by the independent auditor, the open-
ing paragraph of the standard short-form report should be modified in a way
that makes clear the nature of the qualification. It should refer specifically
to the subject of the qualification and ... the effect on financial position
and results of operations, if reasonably determinable.
247. See text accompanying notes 135-51 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 163-78 supra.
249. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683 at 90,360
(E.D. Tenn. 1976). The auditing standards noted by the court deal with the auditor's
responsibility to study and evaluate internal control (second field work standard), to
maintain an independence in mental attitude (second general standard), to exercise
due professional care (third general standard), and to obtain sufficient competent
evidential matter to afford a basis for an opinion (third field work standard).
250. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
251. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBuc ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCI-
PLES BOARD OPINION No. 5 (1964).
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ment eventually disallowed by the Accounting Principles Board. The
court ruled that "fair presentation" dictated that the profits should
not have been recognized currently, and that the auditors should
have realized this.
In the current reporting environment, accounting for oil explora-
tion costs might present a similar problem. Until the issuance of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 19, GAAP did not
specify whether full cost,"' or successful efforts"' accounting was ap-
propriate. An auditor who approved the use of the full cost method
in 1977 financial statements might subsequently be taken to task for
not having provided a "fair presentation" of his client's true current
exploration costs and thus distorting the financial position.
Where GAAP have not been explicitly articulated, the operative
guidelines of the courts clearly appear to be "fair presentation" and
"full disclosure." Because practicing auditors might find these guide-
lines too nebulous to be of practical value, this Article offers operat-
ing guidelines for auditors to help reduce the risk of 10b-5 liability.
VI. GUIDELINES FOR AUDITORS
The foregoing case analyses provide the basis for a number of
suggestions to accountants seeking to minimize their risk of liability.
The guidelines presented below are by no means all inclusive, nor
would adherence to them guarantee ultimate triumph in a Rule
10b-5 suit. But by following these guidelines, the probability of a Rule
10b-5 violation would be substantially reduced. On the other hand,
failure to adhere to the guidelines would likely increase the probabil-
ity of a violation.
A. ALWAYS SCRUPULOUSLY COMPLY WITH GAAP
Whenever GAAP have been formally defined, the auditor should
follow those principles. For an accountant involved in securities mat-
ters, GAAP obviously include the various accounting guidelines
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Indeed, in
two of the three post-Hochfelder cases assessing liability against ac-
countants, there was a failure to follow SEC guidelines.254 If GAAP
252. The full cost accounting method is that in which exploration costs are
capitalized, and amortized over the life of the production fields.
253. The successful efforts accounting method is that in which exploration costs
are currently treated in expense accounts, except for those wells that are productive.
This method is not required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 19.
254. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horvath & Horvath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
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have not been formally defined, the auditor should consider not
whether the financial statements follow the letter of the accounting
laws, but whether a fair presentation of a company's affairs is being
made. Consider seeking the opinion of counsel or of a colleague not
otherwise involved with the client, and document your efforts. The
latter could be relevant to showing "good faith" in a subsequent
defense of your audit work. Finally, provide full disclosure of the
accounting method selected and, at least in your work papers, the
rationale for selecting it.
B. ALWAYS FULLY COMPLY WITH GAAS
There are two dimensions to this guideline. First, be sure to
accumulate sufficient evidentiary matter in all material areas of
client activity, and document your efforts in the audit work papers.
Second, if in conducting the audit you encounter any items or areas
requiring further analysis or audit judgment, follow up on such mat-
ters fully, and form and record your conclusions. If the auditor in
McLeane5 would have followed this guideline and pursued the ac-
counts receivable confirmation, he probably would have been spared
liability.
C. ERR ON THE SIDE OF FULL DISCLOSURE
If one idea could be characterized as central to all the foregoing
cases, it would be that any and all information relevant to the finan-
cial position of the audited concern should be fully disclosed. This
principle is consistent with the fundamental policy of the securities
acts in favor of full disclosure, and should be followed as to any
information the accountant feels might be relevant. It is difficult to
imagine a situation in which erring on the side of full disclosure could
serve as a basis for 10b-5 liability, but it is easy to see how a fact that
seemed of doubtful relevance at the time of the audit might later, in
the blinding glare of hindsight, appear to have been material.
D. IF YOU MAKE A MISTAKE, TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO DIRECTLY
INFORM ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE INJURED BY THE MISTAKE
This is important for two reasons. First, an honest, negligent, or
even reckless misrepresentation or omission is elevated to intentional,
or at least knowing, status once the mistaken party has notice of his
mistake and elects to remain silent. On the other hand, prompt noti-
fication of potentially injured parties is a demonstration of the ac-
countant's good faith and, arguably, evidence of the inadvertent na-
255. See text accompanying notes 135-49 supra.
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ture of the mistake. Second, from a practical standpoint, if a culpable
mistake is recognized quickly enough and proper notification
promptly follows, injury to some parties may be avoided and ultimate
liability thereby lessened. If the defendant accounting firm in the
Adams case-" would have promptly advised all the standard share-
holders of the error in the proxy statement rather than attempting to
cover up the error, a different result might have ensued.
E. DON'T CAVE IN TO CLIENT PRESSURE
Two of the three post-Hochfelder cases assessing liability against
accountants involved obvious elements of auditors crumbling in the
face of client pressure. In Herzfeld, FGL threatened to withdraw its
account and sue Laventhol unless Laventhol rendered a favorable
audit 2-7 In McLean, the court characterized the situation as one in
which an auditor had disregarded his professional responsibilities to
accommodate his client's desire for a speedy audit.21 It should be
obvious that loss of a client or even a suit by a client is, in the vast
majority of cases, to be preferred to a 10b-5 suit by injured investors.
Further, the very fact of extraordinary client pressure should put the
auditor on notice that a disclosure problem may exist, furnishing a
factual basis for an allegation of recklessness. An auditor faced with
such client pressure thus would be well advised to remain ever mind-
ful of his duties to the public.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing guidelines are formulated in accordance with the
conclusion that the recklessness test will ultimately gain ascendancy
as the minimally acceptable standard of behavior by which liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will be assessed. Should subse-
quent events prove otherwise, however, the utility of adherence to the
guidelines would still be substantial. Obviously, behavior that would
be held harmless under a recklessness test would not serve to impose
liability under a more stringent standard. In any event, given the
current trend toward recognition of the recklessness standard, prud-
ence dictates that the auditor should assume its viability in the in-
terim, and govern his behavior accordingly.
256. See text accompanying notes 163-78 supra.
257. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horvath & Horvath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976), discussed at text accompanying notes 83-107 supra.
258. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976), discussed at text
accompanying notes 135-51 supra.
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